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ABSTRACT 
This document reports the findings of the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (JPL) /Software Product Assurance (SPA) Metrics Study, 
conducted as part of a larger JPL effort to improve software 
quality and productivity. Until recently, no comprehensive data 
had been assembled on how JPL manages and develops software- 
intensive systems. The first objective of this study was to 
collect data on software development from as many projects and for 
as many years as possible. Results from five projects are 
discussed. These results reflect 15 years of JPL software 
development, representing over 100 data points (systems and 
subsystems), over a third of a billion dollars, over four million 
lines of code and 28,000 person months. Analysis of this data 
provides a benchmark for gauging the effectiveness of past, present 
and future software development work. In addition, the study is 
meant to encourage projects to record existing metrics data and to 
gather future data. The SPA long term goal is to integrate the 
collection of historical data and ongoing project data with future 
project estimations. If we don't know where we have been and where 
we are now, it is impossible to assess the productivity and quality 
of future software development projects and systems. 
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SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Purpose and Scope 
This document reports the findings of the JPL Software Product 
Assurance (SPA) Metrics Study. The SPA Metrics Study was conducted 
as part of a larger effort to generate quality and productivity 
metrics (measurements) for software development at JPL and ultimately 
to improve software quality and improve the productivity and 
predictability of software development. 
The first objective of the SPA Metrics Study was to collect data 
on software development from as many projects and for as many years 
as possible. Analysis of this data provides a benchmark for gauging 
the effectiveness of past, present and future software development 
work. (If you do not know where you have been and where you are, it 
is difficult to know where you are going.) As an added benefit, the 
study was meant to encourage projects to record existing metrics data 
and systematically to gather future data. 
What follows will discuss results from five projects: Voyager, 
Galileo, the Space Flight Operations Center (SFOC) , a non-NASA 
project, and the Deep Space Network (DSN) Mark IV. 
1 . 2  Background 
JPL is now and will be developing software-intensive systems on a 
large scale. But up to now, JPL has had no way to determine exactly 
what it does well and what needs improvement. Until recently no 
comprehensive data existed on how JPL manages and develops software- 
intensive systems. 
Over the years, bits and pieces of data have been collected by 
individuals on various projects. However, the type of data collected 
varied according to the interests of the person collecting it. If an 
effort was not made soon, data from past projects would be lost. 
Over the last five years, the JPL directors have expressed concern 
about the way the Laboratory develops and manages software-intensive 
systems. In 1985, JPLIs Deputy Director commissioned a Software- 
Intensive System Study. In February 1986, the study team came up with 
a set of conclusions and recommendations. One was to create the 
Systems Software and Operations Resource Center (SSORCE) , formed later 
in 1986, whose primary function is to formulate standards for 
developing and managing JPL software systems. In 1987, the Software 
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Product Assurance (SPA) Section was chartered to improve the software 
development and management process. 
In July 1987, as part of its charter, SPA began collecting and 
analyzing JPL project data with the objective of creating Lab-wide 
measures of quality and productivity for software development. This 
report represents the first attempt to assemble this data. 
1 
, 1.3 Study Method 
Collecting the data was like putting pieces of a puzzle together. 
To assemble the data SPA staff began talking with project people, 
especially those who had been interested in the kind of data SPA 
needed and those who could refer SPA to others who had the data. In 
all, over 150 JPL people were interviewed, ranging from project 
managers, software managers, system engineers, and subsystem engineers 
to cognizant programmers and cognizant development engineers. Actual 
cost and staffing information was readily available from the project 
offices participating in the study. Software development costs, 
however, were more difficult for project offices to identify. In these 
cases, SPA staff were referred tothe appropriate system and subsystem 
engineers and managers. 
Old memorandums and reports were examined as well as old financial 
planning histories, work breakdown structures, and configuration 
management plans. Information sources varied according to each 
project's propensity to keep information. 
Data was assembled based on four basic parameters: lines of code, 
dollars, workmonths, and defects. (See Appendix A for the definition 
of each parameter.) Using these four basic parameters, quality and 
productivity baselines were constructed. Quality is defined as the 
number of defects per thousand lines of source code. Productivity is 
defined in two ways: dollars per source line of code, and source 
lines of code per workmonth. 
1 . 4  Out comes 
At the beginning of the study it appeared that quantitative data 
impossible to retrieve because it had not been kept in any 
standardized form. The study showed, however, how it could (with 
difficulty) be gathered. 
I on JPL's software quality and productivity might be virtually 
In March 1988, the Systems Software and Operations Resource 
Center, through the Software Product Assurance Resource Center, 
contributed funds to help carry on this work. (Their funding 
amounts to about 25 percent of the total funding for this study.) 
1 
2 
This effort has made it possible to refine the collection of future 
metrics data. It has also raised the project staffs' awareness of the 
value of keeping accurate records in a standard format. Most 
importantly, it has laid the foundation for developing cost-estimating 
models and project tracking guidelines for the JPL environment. 
4 
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SECTION 2 
DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY 
Process 
collection proceeded in the following steps: 
Identify the project. Outline project systems and subsystems. 
Develop a set of questions relating the four basic parameters 
to the project's systems and subsystems. 
Meet with the project management staff and determine the 
information available in the project office. Identify other 
sources of information. 
Interview the system engineers and managers and any other 
individuals recommended by the project office. During these 
interviews SPA staff: 
(1) Corroborated the information obtained from the project 
office. 
(2) Corrected and clarified information obtained from the 
project office. In cases where information about a system 
was provided both at the project and system levels, it was 
assumed that data from the system managers and engineers 
was more accurate. 
Added the system/subsystem engineers' information to the 
information from the project office. 
( 3 )  
( 4 )  
Contact the project configuration management organization and 
institutional failure reporting centers. These organizations 
helped obtain line-of-code and failure-count data. 
(Information gathered from configuration management 
organizations varied from project to project. Some project 
configuration management centers kept a record of the number 
of lines of code delivered for each subsystem while others did 
not. ) 
Interview the subsystem task managers, cognizant engineers and 
Identified other sources of data. 
4 
c 
any other individuals identified by the system managers and 
engineers: 
(1) Corroborate information obtained from the project office 
and system managers and engineers. 
(2) Correct and clarify information gathered from these 
sources. Where information about a subsystem was provided 
at the project, system, and subsystem levels, it was 
assumed that data from the subsystem task managers and 
engineers was more accurate. 
( 3 )  Add new information gathered from the subsystem task 
managers and cognizant engineers to the SPA database. 
( 4 )  Identify further sources of information. 
Analyze the overall quality of incoming information. 
Preliminary estimates were produced for the cost of a new line 
of code delivered to operations and of the number of observed 
defects per thousand lines of code at the subsystem level. The 
SPA staff then compared these results to numbers from 
comparable JPL project systems and subsystems. 
Check the validity of these computations by reviewing them 
with system and subsystem engineers and project management 
staff. Since many individuals had not seen information in this 
form before, such reviews were often useful. Project staff 
would remember previously undiscussed aspects of the work and 
would frequently be able to help SPA revise its original 
estimates. (On one occasion, for example, Voyager's ground 
data system engineer remembered costs that weren't included in 
our numbers and identified costs that should not have been 
included. This helped refine SPA'S productivity figures for 
two subsystems.) 
Sources of Data 
Although many people were interviewed, SPA staff tried in all cases 
to go back to the original sources of data. For lines of code, this 
could mean old memorandums, release description documents, 
configuration management library reports, monthly management reviews, 
etc. For information about dollars and workyears, the study used 
financial planning history: B805, C805, D805, Resources Status 
Reports (RSRs), work breakdown structures, etc. Failure reports, 
software problem reports, discrepancy and anomaly reports, software 
change requests, etc. were examined for defect data. (Software change 
requests, however, were not included in the defect count because they 
did not report failures.) 
The study collected data from as many original sources as were 
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available and corroborated the information with the appropriate 
project personnel. Sometimes more than one source contributed to a 
single piece of data. These sources, documents and people, are listed 
in the Appendices for each project. 
Table 1 lists the cost information (dollars and workyears) made 
available to the study by each project. From this, it can be seen 
that for all projects except SFOC the system engineering costs were 
included. Management costs were included only for the non-NASA 
project. Software development costs were included for all projects. 
Contract management costs were included for Voyager Periods 1, 2, 3 ,  
Galileo, the non-NASA project, and partially for DSN Mark IV. No 
spacecraft testing or operations were included for any project. 
Product assurance costs were only included for the non-NASA project 
and in part for DSN Mark IV. System integration costs were included 
for all projects except SFOC and DSN Mark IV. 
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2.3 Data Collection Problems 
A s  with all studies, there were problems. Many of the original 
project personnel were no longer available or had forgotten details 
of past projects. In addition, data had been tracked differently on 
different projects. 
One major benefit of gathering quantitative data is that it 
established what kinds of data were ordinarily collected or not 
collected by various projects. JPL's budget and account system 
provides records of dollars and workyears, but it is not always easy 
to relate these to specific software subsystem efforts. Keeping track 
of lines of code data presented severaldiscrepancies: new code versus 
old code, source code versus object code, estimated lines of code 
versus actual lines of code. 
In collecting defect data, the numbers represent a lower bound of 
actual defects. Many defects probably went unreported and those that 
were reported were classified differently across projects. Although 
defects may occur throughout the development lifecycle, this study has 
focused on the most troublesome kind: post-development defects. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the word  defect^^ in this report always 
refers to a post-development defect. Failure reports are missing f o r  
a number of subsystems. In some cases software failure reports were 
combined with hardware failure reports, making the reports unusable. 
Also, there are still no laboratory-wide defect definitions. 
I 
I For source lines of code, again no standard laboratory definition 
exists nor any overall reporting mechanism. Therefore, with some 
exceptions, this information was pieced together based on what the 
cognizant engineers remembered. 
For dollars and workyears it was difficult to distinguish between 
development costs and related costs (e.g., configuration management 
costs). It was also hard to relate subsystem costs to the phases of 
the lifecycle. And the use of the SRM/RSR system as a reporting 
mechanism made deciphering the data difficult. (It was hard to 
distinguish software development costs from hardware development 
costs, management costs from development costs, etc.) Under this 
system, contractor labor can be listed as a procurement cost, along 
with equipment of all types. This further complicated data gathering. 
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SECTION 3 
RESULTS 
No one involved with this metrics project anticipated how 
comprehensive it would grow in less than a year, especially 
considering the relatively modest level of personnel and funding 
available. The present database encompasses: 
0 102 data points, covering the systems and subsystems of 5 
pro j ects : 
Fliqht Svstems Data Points 
Voyager Period 1 (Development to Launch) 4 
Voyager Period 2 (Launch to Saturn) 4 
Voyager Period 3 (Saturn to Uranus) 3 
Galileo 3 
Subtotal 14 
Ground Svstems 
Voyager Period 1 
Voyager Period 2 
Voyager Period 3 
Galileo 
SFOC 
Non-NASA Project 
DSN Mark IV 
7 
7 
7 
7 
11 
18 
31 
Subtotal 88 
TOTAL 102 
0 4,851,274 source lines of code 
0 28,311 workmonths 
0 $366,862,000 dollars 
To put these numbers in perspective, the study surveyed the 
equivalent of 236 people working for ten years, each producing 20,556 
lines of code, and spending a total of a third of a billion dollars. 
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3.1 Productivity 
3.1.1 Productivity Data 
Table 2 shows the productivity data, summarized by project, and 
separated into flight systems and ground systems. The basic 
parameters of productivity--lines of code, dollars, and workmonths-- 
are itemized for each project. 
As can be seen from Table 2, there is a good spread of projects, 
from small to large. The four flight systems range from 1,200 source 
lines of code (SLOC) to 27,790 SLOC, and the seven ground systems 
range from 45,300 SLOC to 1,288,144 SLOC. Similar ranges occur in 
the dollar and workmonth parameters, both for flight and ground 
systems. 
10 
Table 2. Comprehensive Productivity Data* 
Project SLOC $K** Workmonths 
Flight Systems 
Voyager Period 1 
Voyager Period 2 
Voyager Period 3 
Galileo 
Subtotal 
Ground Systems 
Voyager Period 1 
Voyager Period 2 
Voyager Period 3 
Galileo 
SFOC *** 
Non-NASA *** 
DSN MARK IV 
Subtotal 
TOTAL 
13 , 950 18 , 682 1 , 202 
1,200 1,874 158 
1,200 1,302 198 
2 , 786 28 , 861 27 , 790 
44 , 140 50,719 4 , 344 
742 , 195 
178 , 300 
45,300 
1,278 , 911 
342 , 224 
829 , 180 
1,288,144 
4 , 704 , 254 
46,938 3 , 545 
5,970 851 
3,247 371 
50,095 4 , 633 
11 , 322 1,195 
108 , 788 4,752 
89 , 783 8,620 
316,143 23 , 967 
4 ,748,394 366,862 28,311 
*Adjusted totals. See tables in Appendices B through F f o r  
details. 
dollars) and Non-NASA (1984-1988 real dollars) 
***On-Going 
**FY '87 Dollars, with the exception of SFOC (1986-1988 real 
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3.1.2 Productivity Ratios 
Table 3 presents productivity ratios that can be derived from the 
data in Table 2 and shows average productivity for all analyzed 
projects over the last 15 years. 
For flight systems it has cost an average of $1,149 to produce one 
line of new source code. Ten lines of source code were produced per 
average workmonth. For ground systems, on the average, a line of new 
source code cost $67, with 186 lines of source code produced per 
workmonth. 
If these productivity ratios seem outrageously low, one should 
remember that, for some of the projects, far more than *tprogrammingtl 
is included in these figures. All the workmonths of all the software 
professionals from the start of a project through its delivery to 
system test are being counted. Actual programming constitutes only 
a small percentage of a total system development effort. 
Now for the first time the relative productivity of flight and 
ground systems can be compared. A flight systems line of source code 
costs seventeen times more than a ground systems line of source code. 
Put another way, ground systems can produce nineteen times as many 
lines of source code per workmonth as flight systems. 
Engineers experienced in the development of these systems have 
recognized significant productivity differences between flight systems 
and ground systems (although the 17-to-1 range may surprise some). 
Flight systems must be designed to fit in very limited onboard 
spacecraft computer memory. The extreme reliability and performance 
requirements of onboard code necessitate design, reviews, simulation, 
testing, etc.,, sufficient to support a degree of reliability not 
normally required for ground software. 
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Table 3. Productivity Ratios 
Dollars*/ SLOC/ 
Project s LOC Work Month 
Flight Systems 
Voyager Period 1 
voyager Period 2 
Voyager Period 3 
Galileo 
Cumulative Averacre:*** 
Ground Systems 
Voyager Period 1 
Voyager Period 2 
Voyager Period 3 
Galileo 
SFOC** 
Non-NASA** 
DSN Mark IV 
C u m u l a t i v e  Averacre:*** 
1339 
1562 
1085 
1039 
$ 1 1 4 9  
63 
33 
72 
39 
33 
131 
70 
$67 
12 
8 
6 
9 
10 
209 
210 
122 
276 
286 
123 
149 
186 
*FY '87 Dollars, with the exception of SFOC (1986-1988 real 
dollars) and non-NASA (1984-1988 real dollars) 
**On-Going 
*** Adjusted total dollars f o r  all projects divided by adjusted 
total SLOC for all projects. 
Adjusted total SLOC for all projects divided by adjusted total 
workmonths for all projects. 
See tables in Appendices B through F for details of adjusted 
totals. 
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3.1.3 Productivity Correlations 
To determine the strength of the relationship between these 
productivity ratios, simple regression analyses were performed on each 
set of subsystem data. The results are displayed in Figures 1 through 
I 4. 
For Figure 1: 
For Figure 2: 
For Figure 3: 
For Figure 4: 
Flight software dollars ($K) vs. SLOC: 
$K = 2135.13 + 0.71 SLOC, R = 0.70 
Flight software workmonths vs. SLOC: 
WM = 126.73 + 0.07 SLOC, R = 0.79 
Ground software dollars ($K) vs. SLOC: 
$K = 862.97  + 0.04 SLOC, R = 0.74 
Ground software workmonths vs. SLOC: 
WM = 85.20 + 0.003 SLOC, R = 0.71 
14 
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On all four figures a simple linear regression is used and error 
bars (two dashed lines) represent one standard deviation. 
Given that the data was derived from a variety of sources several 
years old, SPA staff were surprised to find relatively high 
correlation coefficients of 0.70 through 0.79. These correlations 
indicated a stronger relationship than was previously expected from 
JPL archival data. 
One conclusion implied by the correlations is that the cost of 
producing different kinds of flight software and ground system 
software is relatively consistent, even when the systems themselves 
vary in size. This gives one encouragement that productivity ratios 
can be successfully used as one technique to estimate costs of new 
projects. For example, if one line of source code for flight systems 
costs $1,149, a 10,000 line of source code flight system should cost 
around $11,490,000 (in FYI87 value dollars), and take around 1000 
workmonths. 
3.1.4 Comparable Productivity Data 
Given the productivity results f o r  a large database of JPL projects, 
how do these ratios compare with productivity data from similar non- 
JPL projects? Table 4 presents three other productivity studies: one 
involves ten non-JPL NASA projects; a second, the IBM Houston Space 
Shuttle project; and the third, the Magellan ground software project 
at Martin-Marietta. 
In all three studies, the ground software figures are close to the 
JPL ratios. The SLOC-per-Workmonth numbers for the NASA projects 
(130-260) and for the Magellan project (191) compare with JPL's 186. 
The cost of a ground SLOC for the Space Shuttle project ($95-125) 
compares with JPLIs $67 (Table 3). 
For flight software, the SLOC-per-Workmonth productivity figures 
for the NASA projects (44-88) and for the Space Shuttle project (40- 
80) are higher than JPLIs figure (10). It will take further 
evaluation to determine whether this is due to different ways of 
counting, errors in the data, or the possibility that JPL flight 
systems are intrinsically more difficult to produce than the other 
measured systems. A final possibility is that development 
methodologies of flight software projects elsewhere might be more 
productive than JPLIs. 2 
20n the other hand, a recent Air Force study showed 
productivity averages of 10 to 20 SLOC per workmonth for flight 
systems, about the same as JPL's (personal conversation with Bob 
Guarino of Tecolote Research, Inc.). 
19 
In summary, the productivity data stands up to two methods of 
corroboration: there appears to be internal data consistency, as 
shown by the high correlations; there also appears to be external 
consistency, as shown by comparison to non-JPL projects. 
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Table 4 .  Comparable Productivity Data 
Average JPL productivity 
- Flight Software 
- Ground Software 
Productivity of 10 Non JPL NASA Projects* 
10 SLOC/Workmonth 
18 6 S LOC/ W o rkmon th 
- Flight Software 
- Ground Software 
4 4 - 8 8 S LOC/ Workmon t h 
130-260 SLOC/Workmonth 
Space Shuttle, IBM FSD Houston** 
- Flight Software 40-80 SLOC/Workmonth 
$5OO/SLOC (50% maintenance) 
- Ground Software $95-125/SLOC (50% maintenance) 
Magellan (Partials), Martin Marietta*** 
- Ground Software 191 SLOC/Workmonth 
* Hamid Habib-Agahi, James Quirk, Shantanu Malhotra, IISoftware 
Productivity and Costs in NASA Projects, II JPL 900-990, January, 
1988 (JPL internal document) 
** Unpublished report 
***Paul Scheffer, Allen Bucher, IISoftware Productivity on a Portion 
of the Magellan Spacecraft Ground Data System, June 1987 
(Martin Marietta Astronautics Group of Martin Marietta Denver 
Aerospace, under contract #956700 with JPL) 
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3.2 Quality 
3.2.1 Quality Data 
Table 5 presents quality data for four flight projects (the three 
periods of Voyager and Galileo) and for six ground projects. The 
quality data incorporates SLOC data and adds defect data. The defect 
data derives from a variety of failure reports (see Section 2.2) and 
only shows post-development defect numbers. 
SFOC and the non-NASA project are ongoing projects and therefore are 
still in the process of finding defects. In the case of the non- 
NASA project, post-development defects are just beginning to be found 
and are not included in this report. For SFOC,  there is data on 
development and post-development defects. The post-development defect 
numbers for these projects represent a definite lower bound (true for 
all projects in this report) and can be expected to continue to rise 
as testing continues. 
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Table 5. Comprehensive Quality Data* 
~~ 
Project SLOC Defects* * 
Flight Systems 
Voyager Period 1 
Voyager Period 2 
Voyager Period 3 
Galileo 
Total 
Ground Systems 
Voyager Period 1 
Voyager Period 2 
Voyager Period 3 
Galileo 
SFOC 
DSN Mark IV 
13 , 950 - - 
27,790 
142 -*** 
- 
2 18 
41,740 
742 , 195 
178 , 300 
45,300 
1,278 , 911 
342 , 224 
1 , 292 , 715 
Total 3 , 879 , 645 
360 
200 
1,147 
145 
2 , 341 
1,038 
3,412 
8 , 283 
*Adjusted totals. See tables in Appendices B through F for 
details. 
**Defects are defined as problem and operational failure reports 
- post development defects 
Data is incomplete 
Note: 
not completed development 
At the time of the study, SFOC and the non-NASA project had 
*** II - I 1  indicates data was unavailable 
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3.2.2 Quality Ratios 
Table 6 presents the quality ratio (defects per thousand lines of 
source code [ K S L O C ] )  for flight and ground systems. For the two 
flight projects with defect data, there was an average of 8.6 defects 
per KSLOC left in the code post-development. 
A s  can be seen 
from Table 6, the number of defects per KSLOC for the six ground 
systems remains relatively consistent, considering the difficulties 
encountered in collecting defect data. 
But as in the case of productivity, there is a difference in quality 
figures between flight and ground systems. In this case, however, 
even though flight systems appear to have greater than four times more 
defects per KSLOC than ground systems, it may be an artifact in the 
data. With flight systems there is certainly better defect collection 
and reporting than with ground software--most likely due to the high 
visibility in the spacecraft test environment. When the information 
for this report was collected, SPA staff were repeatedly t o l d  by 
projects that for ground systems many defects were found and fixed but 
never formally reported or recorded. It is recommended that a system 
be put in place that records ground defects as well. If defects are 
not tracked, it is difficult to improve either the process or the 
product. 
The six ground systems had 2.0 defects per KSLOC. 
2 4  
Table 6 .  Quality Ratios 
Project Def ects/KSLOC* 
Flight Systems 
Voyager Period 1 
Voyager Period 2 
Voyager Period 3 
Galileo 
Cumulative Averaqe*** 
Ground Systems 
Voyager Period 1 
Voyager Period 2 
Voyager Period 3 
Galileo 
SFOC 
DSN Mark IV 
Cumulative Averaqe*** 
10.20 - ** 
- 
7.80 
8 . 6 0  
0.27 
6.43 
3.20 
1.80 
3.03 
2.60 
2.10 
* Data is incomplete 
** Defect data not available 
*** Adjusted total defects for all projects divided by adjusted 
total KSLOC for all projects. 
Note: Defect data is generally unreliable because there is no 
standard definition of a post-development defect at JPL and because 
there is no standard procedure for tracking defects. 
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3.2.3 Comparable Quality Data 
Table 7 presents three non-JPL quality reports that shed some light 
on the JPL data. 
At IBM Systems Programming, the number of ground system defects 
discovered after delivery ranged from 10 per thousand lines of code 
in the 1970s to 3 per thousand lines of code in 1980 to 1 per thousand 
lines of code in 1985. At IBM/FSD Houston, the number of flight 
system defects released to the customer (in this case NASA) ranged 
from 2.25 per thousand lines of code in 1982 to .08 per thousand lines 
of code in 1985. Both IBM Systems Programming and IBM/FSD Houston 
have rigorous quality programs. They use the technique of Fagan 
inspections, and they find and fix defects early. Between 1982 and 
1985 IBM/FSD went from finding 50% to finding 90% of all defects 
before configuration control. In contrast, a report developed by the 
Rome Air Development Center (U. S .  Air Force) that covered 59 airborne, 
strategic and tactical systems representing over five million lines 
of code reflected a fault density of 9 . 4  defects per thousand lines 
of code. 
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Table 7. Comparable Quality Data 
o Average JPL Quality Defects/KSLOC 
- Flight Software - Ground Software 8.6 2.1 
o IBM Systems Programming* Defects/KSLOC 
- Ground Software: 1970 
1980 
1985 
10 
3 
1 
o IBM FSD Space Shuttle** Defects/ KS LOC 
- Flight Software: 1982 
1983 
1984 
2.25 
0.97 
0.08 
o RADC Reliability Report*** 
- Systems: 59 (Airborne,Strategic, Tactica1,etc.) 
- Lines of Code: 5,235,000 
- Quality: 9.4 Defects/KSLOC 
* A. M. Pietrasanta, "Software Engineering Management", IBM Japan 
Technology Institute, September 1987 
** B. G. Kolkhorst, "Space Shuttle Primary Onboard Software 
Development: Process Control and Defect Cause Analysis1', IBM 
92-0069 
***Software Reliability Resolution and Estimation Guidebook, 
RADC-TR-87-171 August 1987 
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SECTION 4 
CONCLUSIONS 
The JPL SPA Metrics Study data collection effort was difficult and 
complex, especially because data was often gathered years after the 
fact. During the data collection process, weaknesses were discovered 
in various areas. One overall weakness that SPA discovered was in the 
recording and tracking of ground software quality (i.e., defects). 
There appears to be no consistent system in place to accurately report 
all major ground software defects. Nevertheless, the three workyears 
expended on this effort produced worthwhile results. JPL now has a 
rough measurement foundation for software productivity and software 
quality and an order-of-magnitude quantitative baseline for software 
systems and subsystems. In other words, JPL has the beginning of a 
handle on estimating costs for future projects. 
Undertaking this study has also resulted in some observations that 
can benefit anyone conducting metrics studies: 
0 Start simple - Using four parameters and a rough order-of- 
magnitude refinement is not too small a starting point. 
0 Start as soon as possible - It is surprising how quickly data 
can be lost or forgotten. 
Follow every lead - Collecting data is like assembling a jigsaw 
puzzle. No lead is too trivial. 
0 
0 Don't take no for an answer - 'rNoll usually means you haven't 
asked the right question. 
0 Don't pursue tangents. 
0 Make sure data sources can always be identified. 
0 Don't get discouraged. 
When this study began, it seemed as if it might be impossible to 
retrieve quantitative data on JPL's software productivity and quality. 
This study shows not only that it was possible, but how to do it. 
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SECTION 5 
FUTURE PLANS 
The SPA long-term goal is to integrate the collection of historical 
data and ongoing project data with future project estimations. More 
projects will soon be included in the historical database. The 
existing data will be refined to have greater granularity. For 
example, data will be distinguished by languages; new, modified and 
old code; and JPL and contractor productivity. A goal will be to 
differentiate between costs incurred during different phases of the 
software development lifecycle. Data will be assembled on both pre- 
and post-development defects and on which defects were major and which 
minor. And, based on the work of Basili and others, additional 
metrics parameters are being added to the four used in this study. 
For projects just starting up, SPA is developing a simple set of 
recommendations for tracking the progress, quality, and productivity 
of software development projects. These recommendations will be 
outlined in a guidebook and explained in a SPA training course. 
Finally, SPA is evaluating simple, practical cost-estimating 
algorithms, and intends to adapt several to the JPL environment. The 
algorithms will be calibrated using historical and ongoing project 
data. After the tailored algorithms are developed, SPA will provide 
a guidebook and training courses for JPL project personnel. 
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APPENDIX A 
DEFINITIONS 
A-l 
APPENDIX A 
DEFINITIONS 
Four types of cost and quality data were collected during this 
study. These were: 
a. Source Lines of Code (SLOC) 
b. Software Development Cost in Thousands of Dollars ( $ K )  
c. Software Development Effort in Workmonths (WM) 
d. Defect Counts (DEF) 
Each of these data types is described below. 
1. Source Lines of Code _ISLOCI - is defined to be a non-blank, 
non-comment physical line of code. One thousand lines of source code 
are abbreviated as KSLOC. This study counts only the new lines of 
source code delivered to operations. 
2. Thousands of Dollars ( S K I  - is the technical labor cost of the 
software development effort, from the start of the project to delivery 
to operations, in thousands of dollars. An attempt has been made to 
normalize all dollars to 1987 dollars. (In the case of SFOC and the 
non-NASA project it was not possible to break out the dollars by year 
and the numbers presented in this report for those projects are real 
dollars.) Specifically included in the costs are: 
a. Software requirements specification, design, implementation, 
test, and integration at the subsystem level. 
b. System engineering costs. These costs cannot be allocated 
to individual subsystems, but are included in the total 
system and project costs. 
c. System integration and test costs. Like system engineering 
costs, these costs cannot be allocated to individual 
systems, but are included in the system and project totals. 
d. Contract management costs. Depending on the project and the 
nature of the contract, these costs may be allocated to 
individual subsystems, entire systems, or the project. The 
data for each individual project must be consulted to 
determine how contract management costs were counted. 
A-2 
Unless noted otherwise, excluded costs were: 
a. Project management costs, 
b. Division representative costs, 
c. Line management costs, 
d. Software Product Assurance costs, 
e. Operations and Maintenance costs, 
f. Spacecraft testing costs. 
3. Workmonth IWM) - is the cost in man-months of the software system 
development effort, from project inception to delivery to operations. 
It is total number of months expended by software personnel. Both JPL 
personnel and contractors were included in these totals. Included and 
excluded costs are the same as those for dollars. 
4. Defects _IDEFI - are the number of software problem reports 
recorded for each subsystem's software, starting at System Integration 
and Test. The types of problem reports counted are: 
a. Failure Reports (FRs) - written against Mission Operation 
systems. 
b. Problem/Failure Reports (P/FRs) -written against spacecraft 
systems only. 
c. Discrepancy Reports (DRs) - written against DSN systems 
during operations. 
d. Anomaly Reports (ANOM) - Both DSN systems and the non-NASA 
project wrote Anomaly Reports during System Integration and 
Test. 
e. Incident/Surprise/Anomaly Reports (ISAs) - written against 
Mission Operations systems or spacecraft systems during 
operations. 
f. Discrepancy/Anomaly Reports (DARs) - written against SFOC 
software during development. 
Unless otherwise specified, subsystem-level unit and integration 
testing problem reports are not included in the totals. 
The following derived ratios are indicators characterizing software 
quality and productivity. 
a. Productivity = Dollars per source line of code ($/SLOC) 
b. Productivity = Source lines of code per workmonth (SLOC/WM) 
c. Quality = Defects per thousand lines of source code 
( DEF/ KS LOC ) 
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B . l  Voyager Description 
B . 2  Voyager Data Collection and Results 
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APPENDIX B. 1 
VOYAGER DESCRIPTION 
The Voyager mission is to gather information about the structure, 
evolution, and processes of the outer solar system. The timing of 
the mission reflects the fact that once every 175 years, the outer 
planets align themselves such that one spacecraft, using gravitational 
assists, could pass each on its way out of the solar system. 
This study has divided the Voyager project into three periods: 
Period 1: FY 1971 - FY 1977 - Voyager pre-launch 
Period 2: FY 1978 - FY 1982 - Launch through Saturn 
encounter 
Period 3: FY 1983 - FY 1986 - Post-Saturn through Uranus 
encounter 
Voyager was decomposed into three periods because there was new 
development taking place during each one of the periods listed above. 
The Voyager project office also organized the financial data in this 
same way, assigning new project and account numbers to each of the 
three periods listed above. 
Figure B.1shows the configuration ofthe Voyager Flight Software 
(FSW) and Ground Data System (GDS). A brief description of their 
subsystems follows: 
- FSW 
Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem (AACS) - The 
AACS keeps the spacecraft on the desired course and 
attitude. It also controls the pointing of the 
instrumentation and high-gain antennas. 
Command and Control Subsystem (CCS) - The CCS receives and 
executes commands uplinked from the ground. 
Flight Data Subsystem (FDS) - The FDS collects data from the 
science and engineering subsystem aboard the spacecraft and 
transmits it to the ground for further analysis. 
- GDS 
Telemetry Subsystem (TLM) - The TLM receives the bit stream 
from the spacecraft, synchronizes and decrypts it, and 
passes it along to the Data Records Subsystem. 
B-2 
Data Records Subsystem (DRS) - The DRS decommutates and 
catalogs the incoming data, allowing the science 
investigators and mission operations personnel to 
selectively view the engineering and experimental returns. 
Spacecraft Analysis Subsystem (SAS) - The SAS provides the 
mission operations personnel the capability needed to 
monitor the health of the spacecraft. 
Mission Sequencing Subsystem (MSS) - The MSS allows 
construction of command sequences that will be uplinked to 
the spacecraft. It includes simulation capabilities that 
allow the effects of such sequences to be evaluated prior 
to their being transmitted. 
Navigation Subsystem (NAV) - The NAV is used to compute the 
maneuvers that the spacecraft will have to make to reach 
its target. To achieve the required accuracy, the NAV 
software models in extremely fine detail the motions of the 
planets and satellites that the spacecraft will encounter. 
Mission Planning Subsystem (MA&E) - MA&E was developed 
expressly for the purpose of determining the mission 
trajectories, and was used only prior to launch. 
In addition to those subsystems listed above are some activities 
which are relevant only at the system level: they cannot be allocated 
among individual subsystems. The FSW includes the Flight Software 
System Engineering effort. The GDS includes System Engineering and 
Computer Support activities. 
Not included in this study are two GDS subsystems: Command 
Subsystem (CMD) and Radio Science Subsystem (RSS). The information 
available for RSS was not accurate enough to include, while the 
information relating to the CMD was not readily obtainable. 
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APPENDIX B.2 
VOYAGER DATA COLLECTION AND RESULTS 
The data collected for purposes of this study was obtained from 
a variety of sources. Following are the primary documents used in the 
data collection effort and personnel contacted. Unique aspects of 
the project, data, or collection effort are also discussed. 
Dollar data was primarily obtained from the Financial Planning 
History (D805-13) for Voyager and from talking to project and 
engineering personnel. 
Workmonth data came from Voyager Work Breakdown Structures dating 
from 1972 to the present and from talking to individuals. 
Source lines of code data was found in two documents: D618-327 
Voyager Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem Flight Software 
Control Document: and IOM 366.15-197 IIVoyager Considerations Regarding 
Operation Software Capability with Respect to the Large Computer 
Replacementt1 Robert E .  Hill. 
Defect data for each subsystem in the GDS has been obtained from 
the GDS configuration management librarian and the Problem and Failure 
Accountability (PFA) Center. Defect data for FSW was provided by the 
Cognizant Development Engineer for Flight Systems. 
Personnel Interviewed 
Gerry Fleischer 
Sam Deese 
Dick Rice 
Ed Blizzard 
Robert E. Hill 
Joe Stoltzfus 
Paul Penzo 
Joe Beerer 
George Masters 
Pete Breckheimer 
Kerry Erickson 
Doug Griffith 
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SLOC 
DEF 
General 
(Those listed above and) 
Dick Haga 
Ted Kopf 
Roy Otamura 
Ron Spriestersbach 
Glenn E. Cunningham 
Marilyn Oifer 
Cas Sagoian 
Stuart deJesus 
John Rohr 
Tom Loesch 
Gerry Crichton 
Fred Hammer 
Bob Berwin 
Wyatt Underwood 
Ken Oslund 
Jan Gohlke 
Brent Bennett 
Robert E. Hill 
Pat Laubert 
Bill Hodgson 
Ed Kelly 
Jim Wilson 
Bob Polansky 
Mike deGyurky 
Ben Toshima 
Dick Rudd 
Bill Gray 
Jack Tupman 
Harry Woo 
As has already been noted, there was Voyager data used in this 
study that had never been permanently recorded. Collection of this 
data required recall from memory and/or estimation on the part of the 
cognizant personnel. Some of the data collected covers only a portion 
of the work effort involved. Metrics involving these numbers 
represent lower bounds on the quantities being measured and are 
presented as such. In addition to the above observations, the 
following limitations should also be considered when viewing the data 
presented in this report: 
1. The cost for the Data Records Subsystem (DRS) is 
considerably more uncertain than for the other ground software. In 
particular, during the third period the cost per SLOC of DRS is an 
order of magnitude less than it was during the first two periods. 
2. The costs, staffing, and SLOC data for the MA & E and the 
TTS are less accurate than those for other subsystems. Development 
of the MA & E software was less controlled than that for other ground 
systems, which resulted in fewer records of that development effort 
B-6 
being kept. The TTS development effort was spread over more account 
numbers than many other subsystems, thereby making it much more 
difficult to obtain a complete picture of the TTS costs. With regard 
to the TTS SLOC data, fewer individuals were available who could 
recall or point to this data. 
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APPENDIX C.l 
GALILEO DESCRIPTION 
The Galileo primary mission is to gather information about the 
atmosphere of the planet Jupiter. This will include temperature, 
pressure, and composition data collected by a probe released into the 
Jovian atmosphere. The Galileo trajectory will also allow a close 
pass of two asteroids. 
The Galileo project began in 1977 and is expected to arrive at 
Jupiter in 1995, with scheduled completion of the mission in 1 9 9 7 .  
The data in this report represents the period from inception through 
FY'86. 
Figure C.l shows the configuration of the Galileo Flight and 
A brief description of these Ground Software systems and subsystems. 
systems follows: 
Flisht Software: 
Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem (AACS) - The AACS 
determines and controls the attitude of the spacecraft. It also 
controls the motion of the scan platform on which many of the 
instruments are mounted. 
Command and Data Subsystem (CDS) - The CDS receives, processes, 
and distributes to other subsystems commands uplinked from the 
ground. It also collects engineering and scientific data from 
the spacecraft subsystems and transmits them to the ground. 
System Fault Protection (FP) - The FP software is resident on 
both the above flight subsystems, and was developed by the 
Systems Engineering organization to allow the spacecraft to 
recover from situations such as power bus undervoltages, loss of 
celestial reference, and loss of functionality in a redundant 
component. 
Ground Data System: 
Telemetry Subsystem (TLM) - The TLM receives the raw data from 
the spacecraft. It organizes this data into frames that are 
ready to be processed by the Data Management Subsystem. 
DataManagement Subsystem (DMS) - The DMS provides facilities for 
cataloging the incoming data. It also allows the science 
investigators and the mission operations personnel to view the 
information they need to accomplish their tasks. 
c-2 
Mission Sequencing Subsystem (MSS) - The MSS provides the 
capability of constructing command sequences to be transmitted 
to the spacecraft. It includes simulation capabilities that 
predict the result of any command sequences to be transmitted to 
the spacecraft, thereby minimizing the chances of unexpected 
changes to the spacecraftls state. 
Orbiter Engineering Subsystem (OES)  - The OES provides the 
capabilities used by the mission operations staff in analyzing 
data received from the spacecraft to monitor its health. 
Mission Design Subsystem (MDS) - The MDS software was developed 
to identify possible spacecraft trajectories that would meet the 
scientific data collection requirements of the mission. 
Navigation Subsystem (NAV) - The NAV is responsible for 
determining to great accuracy the position and trajectory of the 
spacecradft during the course of the mission. All maneuver 
planning is dependent upon the outputs from this subsystem. 
In addition to those subsystems listed above are some activities 
which are relevant only at the system level; they cannot be allocated 
among individual subsystems. These activities include the Flight 
Software System Engineering effort and the Ground Software System 
Engineering effort. 
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APPENDIX C.2 
GALILEO DATA COLLECTION AND RESULTS 
The data collected for purposes of this study was obtained from a 
variety of sources. Following are the primary documents used in the 
data collection effort and personnel contacted. Unique aspects of 
the project, data, or collection effort are also discussed. 
$,WM Backup material for IOM GLL-PMM-85-055 IIGalileo Report for the 
Software Intensive Systems Studytt by Pat Molko 
B805, Workforce Planning and Actuals 
C805, Cost Plan History 
D805, Cost and Staffing Actuals 
Financial Planning History Reports 
SLOC IlGalileo Project Software Margin Management Report" Feb. 19, 1986 
Personnel Interviewed 
$, WM, SLOC Chris Hartsough 
Bob Mitchell 
Pete Breckheimer 
Carole Hamilton 
Pat Molko 
Allen Nikora 
Steve Zawacki 
A1 Schoepke 
Wayne Sible 
Jan Chodas 
John Lai 
Tina Walker 
R. Haga 
L. DIAmario 
Frank Singleton 
DEF Tonja Harris 
Galileo has suffered many schedule changes throughout the history 
of the project. One of the most significant delays occurred as a 
result of the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster in January 1986. 
Galileo was to have launched soon after but due to the indefinite 
postponement of the shuttle program as well as concerns about 
Galilee's propellant system, there were changes made to the overall 
mission. Many work years and dollars have gone into the project since 
that time but there have been no major new software deliveries. The 
existing code has been modified, extensively in some areas, and this 
kind of information will be examined in later phases of this data 
collection effort. The data in this report represents the period from 
inception through FY86. 
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APPENDIX D-1 
SFOC DESCRIPTION 
The Space Flight Operations Center (SFOC) Project was established 
in February 1984 and was designed to develop systems that meet Flight 
Projects' ground data support needs, either with project-specific 
adaptations or as true multimission capabilities usable by several 
flight projects. This will help to reduce overall costs of Mission 
Operations and enable the decommissioning of the aging Mission Control 
and Computing Center (MCCC) equipment. 
The starting point f o r  the extended SFOC Project is the version 
of the SFOC system that will support Magellan Launch (SFOC Version 7). 
This report covers all data through Version 7. The software 
subsystems include core subsystems and applications subsystems. 
The SFOC core subsystems provide a ttcorett capability for a ground 
data system that allows for basic data transport, data storage and 
retrieval, and data monitor and display. They are: 
Common Data Access Subsystem (CDA) , which provides access to data 
storage and retrieval using the Data Base Management System, 
file-management, and spooler software: and provides general data 
management services to other subsystems. 
Data Transport Subsystem (DTS), which provides data 
communications and transport services between and within SFOC 
subsystems and computers. 
Workstation Environment Subsystem (WSE),  which provides the data 
processing environment in which most SFOC applications run, 
including standard user interface and display. 
These three core subsystems provide a standard operating 
environment in which all SFOC and Flight Project applications will 
operate. 
Several software applications have been developed to support 
Magellan launch requirements. The design of these application 
software subsystems furnishes the basis to allow adaptation or 
conversion for other flight projects included in the scope of the 
SFOC Project Plan, following the Magellan launch. 
Ground Communication Facility Interface (GIF), which provides the 
interface from the Deep Space Network ( D S N )  and the Interim 
Simulation Subsystem to SFOC. GIF will interface with the Ground 
D-2 
Communications Facility Central Communications Terminal (GCFCCT) 
Via a local area network gateway or via router and wideband 
switch to the SFOC Local Area Networks. GIF includes a data 
capture and recall funtion. 
Telemetry Input Subsystem (TIS), which performs input processing 
on telemetry frames and DSN monitor blocks, including frame 
synchronization, error detection and correction (decoding), 
synchronous and asynchronous extraction, depacketization, and 
decommutation. 
Data Monitor and Display (DMD), which performs standard 
processing and display of telemetry and other channelized types, 
including incoming data in real time, near-real time, and 
recalled from long-term storage. 
Digital TV Subsystem (DTV), which generates displays of telemetry 
and other data for distribution and display via the Closed- 
Circuit Television Facility (CCTV). 
SFOC Monitor and Control Subsystem (SMC), which monitors 
performance and provides control mechanisms for the SFOC data 
processing system and specific processes in it. 
Central Database (CDB), which retrieves, catalogs, and archives 
important SFOC data. 
Test Workstation (TWS), which provides data stream analysis and 
troubleshooting capabilities to aid in problem identification and 
isolation. 
Command Subsystem (CMD), which performs real-time command 
generation and merging with command files prepared by the 
Sequence Generation Subsystem. It controls transmission of 
commands to the DSN for radiation to the spacecraft. 
Simulation Subsystem (SIM) generates simulated data for test and 
training purposes and inputs it to SFOC via the GIF Subsystem. 
External User Access Subsystem (EUA) provides access with 
appropriate security to SFOC data. 
Magellan High Rate Telemetry Subsystem (MHR) is tasked to process 
large volumes of telemetry data, which will be shipped to JPL on 
magnetic tapes from the ground stations that are in radio contact 
with the spacecraft. 
NOTE: CMD, EUA, MHR, and SIM were not delivered in Version 7 
(September 16, 1988) and therefore are not included in this report. 
D-3 

APPENDIX D.2 
SFOC DATA COLLECTION AND RESULTS 
The data collected for purposes of this study was obtained from 
a variety of sources. Following are the primary documents used in the 
data collection effort and personnel contacted. Unique aspects of 
the project, data, or collection effort are also discussed. 
Cost and staffing information was obtained from the Resource 
Status Record (RSR), the D805-13 financial planning history reports 
kept by Section 367, and from miscellaneous internal reports used in 
project tracking. These reports contain actual cost and staffing 
information for each account number to which SFOC charges are made 
and provide a breakdown by subsystem and version. Section 367 
supplied the Work Breakdown Structures (WBS) from which preliminary 
maps relating accounts to individual systems and subsystems are made. 
The remainder of the information collected was obtained by meeting 
with the individuals responsible for the software development. 
Source lines of code data was obtained from the system engineers, 
the subsystem engineers, cognizant software engineers, and cognizant 
engineers. The data in this section covers the period between the 
inception of this task in 1984 to September 1988. Cost and staffing 
information only include the software development resources expended 
by the development organization (Control Center Data Systems 
Development Section - 367). 
Because SFOC is an on-going task, post-development defects are 
still being discovered. The more complete count of defects reported 
are development defects, tracked by Discrepancy/Anomaly Reports 
( D A R s )  . These reports were issued when the subsystem was placed under 
configuration management. Post-development defects are reported as 
Failure Reports (FRs) and are under Configuration Management control. 
Both types of defect data are reported in this report. 
Personnel Interviewed 
Dick Moulder 
Frank Singleton 
Alma Cadwaller 
Hal Norman 
D-5 
SLOC, DEF Dorothy Huffman 
Armik Ebrahimian 
Dave Klemp 
Marge Craig 
~ 
General Mike Ebersole 
Pam Ray 
Bob Hall 
Steve Huffman 
Chris Hartsough 
The data collected for the SFOC project is presented in Table 
D.l. One ratio that stands out in the table of SFOC data is the 
productivity figure (SLOC/WM) for WSE. It appears to be very high, 
both absolutely and relative to other SFOC subystems. According to 
the Cognizant Engineer, this appears to be due to a combination of 
factors. WSE consists of libraries and applications and has a 
presentation layer on top of x-windows, isolating the applications 
programs from the x-windows; WSE has many small routines; the level 
of complication was not high; and there was an extremely productive 
staff that worked well together. In contrast, DTS has a very low 
productivity figure. This subsystem was very complex and suffered 
from personnel problems which required redoing the code more than 
I once, lowering productivity. 
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APPENDIX E 
Non-NASA Project 
(Data for this project not available for publication) 
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APPENDIX F.l 
DSN MARK IV DESCRIPTION 
The Deep Space Network (DSN) MARK IV project (1981-1985) is a 
very large ground based data system providing consolidation of 
previously collocated Ground Spaceflight and Tracking Data Network 
stations into the DSN. It provided new monitor and control capability 
and control size processing to support the Voyager I1 encounter with 
Uranus. It also provides automation of the Goldstone, Madrid, and 
Canberra tracking stations within the DSN. 
The DSN MARK IV project consists of four large systems. The 
A system/subsystem structures are shown in Figures F.l through F.4. 
brief description of the systems follows: 
Deep Space Communications Complex (DSCCI 
Receiver-Exciter Subsystem (RCV) 
Transmitter Subsystem (TXR) 
Tracking Subsystem (TRK) 
Antenna Mechanical Subsystem (ANT) 
Antenna Microwave Subsystem (UWV) 
Frequency and Timing Subsystem (FTS) 
Technical Facility Subsystem (FAC) 
Telemetry Subsystem (DTM) 
Command Subsystem (DCD) 
Test Support Subsystem (TSA) 
Spectrum Processing Subsystem (DSP) 
Monitor and Control Subsystem (DMC) 
The ANT Subsystem includes a 64-meter sub-subsystem, a 34-meter 
HA/DEC sub-subsystem, and a 34-meter AZ/EL sub-subsystem. 
Network Operation Control Center (NOCC) 
Tracking Subsystem (NTK) 
Telemetry Subsystem (NTM) 
Command Subsystem (NCD) 
Monitor and Control Subsystem (NMC) 
Support Subsystem (NSS) 
VLBI Support Subsystem (NRV) 
Radio Science Subsystem (NRS) 
Navigation Subsystem (NAV) 
Ground Communication Facility (GCF) 
Central Communications Monitor Subsystem (GCM) 
Data Records Subsystem (GDR) 
Digital Communications Subsystem (GDC) 
F-2 
Test Sumort System (SPT) 
Telemetry System Performance (TLMSPT) 
Command System Performance (CMDSPT) 
System Performance Executive Test (EXECSPT) 
Tracking System Performance (TRKSPT) 
Data for NOCC-NAV was unavailable so this subsystem is excluded 
from this study. 
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APPENDIX F.2 
DSN MARK IV DATA COLLECTION AND RESULTS 
The data collected for purposes of this study was obtained from 
Following are the primary documents used in the a variety of sources. 
data collection effort and the personnel contacted. 
Cost and staffing data were obtained from the Tracking and Data 
Acquisition (TDA) Work Authorization Documents (WADS) and the 
financial planning history reports for the DSN (B805, Workforce 
Planning and Actuals; C805, Cost Plan History; and D805, Cost and 
Staffing Actuals). These documents provided the data for the 
computation of actual and planned software development costs and 
staffing for each subsystem. Due to the lack of existence of an 
accounting map, a great deal of time and effort was expended on 
extracting this information from these documents which include the 
account number for all DSN projects for the period 1981-85. 
The number of source lines of code and defects in each subsystem 
was provided by the Software Planning and Management Center (SPMC), 
Section 368. The DSN required SPMC to track all software developed 
on the assembly, subsystem, and system levels during the development, 
testing, and delivery phases. Although SPMC has provided an accurate 
assessment of the number of source lines of code and anomalies in the 
MK-IV software, it does not track Discrepancy Reports (DRs). Some 
of this information was found in the Release Description Document for 
each subsystem's software, obtained from the PFA center. However, 
the remaining DRs were tracked by the contractor (BENDIX) at the 
stations. 
$ Mary Ann Gero 
Joe Dominguez 
SLOC/DEF Pat Shepard 
Mary Wittman 
Ben Parvin 
Rob Warren 
Pete Breckheimer 
WM Chuck Bricker 
Joe Wackley 
Neal Kuo 
GENERAL Paul Westmoreland 
John Leflang 
The data collected is presented in Table F.l. 
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